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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9191
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9754

S E C R E T RIYADH 001423

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, AND
DS/IP/SPC/MSG
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [SA](#)
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 17 SEPTEMBER 2008

REF: SANAA 1547

Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) On September 17, the DCM convened a meeting of the EAC to discuss the Missions security posture in light of today's attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. Also present in the meeting were POL, ECON, PA, CONS, BPM, MGT, MED, ISC, AGR, DAO, POL-MIL, MSG, OPM-SANG, DHS and RSO.

¶2. (S/NF) RSO opened the meeting with an account of information on the attack in Sanaa as reported by the press and television. At the time of the EAC meeting, little official reporting had been obtained from Embassy Sanaa itself. Unofficial reports described a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) 'car bomb' which detonated near the perimeter wall of the embassy, followed by sporadic gun fire. These initial reports included a casualty report ranging from 1 local guard to 10 other persons of unspecified nationality and occupation.

¶3. (S/NF) Reftel contained portions of a letter received by Embassy Sanaa from the "Islamic Jihadist Organization" that called for "sleepers cells in Yemen, Saudi and the UAE to prepare according to the proposed plan for VBIED attacks on foreign interests, especially British and American.

¶4. (S/NF) The DCM instructed EAC to review with their respective sections the current security situation at post. The DCM requested that appropriate Saudi security forces be requested to provide additional security in the vicinity of the Embassy and our facilities. RSO noted that the Embassy was at a heightened security posture and confirmed the readiness of the guard force and MSG detachment responses.

¶5. (S) The following actions were taken by the Riyadh EAC:

- No unessential travel off the Diplomatic Quarter (DQ) for the next 48 hours
- Immediate cancellation of all social events that involve outside guests for the next week
- Immediate test of the IDNS/SelectTone Drills (duck and cover & Evacuation)
- Telephone and cell phone test to be conducted this date
- Review external wall project and reinforce any weak points
- Country-Wide Wardens Message
- Request extra Saudi security presence around facilities
- SSF for AMB (in Jeddah), DCM (Riyadh) and CGs (Dhahran and

Jeddah) alerted of threat with extra security for each official requested

- All reminded to carry cell phone at all times and radio at all times
- Remind all motor pool drivers of SOP in the event they are off DQ and a Lock-Down occurs.
- MSG Detachment on call status until further notice
- LGF reviewed frequently and kept alert.
- Noticed reissued on color coded Emergency Evacuation Routes familiarization
- Immediate closure of Annex compound for social events.
- The establishment of emergency teams, including a first responder team, an internal defense team, and an excavation team.

¶8. (U) Jeddah and Dhahran conducted their own EAC meetings, reported separately.

¶9. (U) POC for this reporting in Riyadh is RSO John C. Taylor.
FRAKER